Abstract:
R.E. Hobart argues that free will is “inconceivable” without some form of determinism. I will examine what he means about this remark and the free will/determinism issue in the context of the essays by Hobart, Chisholm, van Inwagen and O’Connor. Do we have “free will”? Is it explicable or a “mystery” (as van Inwagen suggests)? How does the issue of causation (in particular, agent causation) tie in?
Feb 212001
Feb 212001
Abstract:
How do I know who I am? I will examine the basic issues surrounding personal identity, using the articles by Shoemaker, Parfit and Swinburne as a basis for this essay. Why does personal identity arise as a metaphysical issue in the first place? Can a materialist account satisfy odd cases such as multiple personality?
Feb 212001
Abstract:
I will take a close look at C.D. Broad’s “penny”, deciding on the ontological status of appearances. I will determine if it is one ontological entity or many (multiplied indefinitely by a ghostly array of “appearances”). Considering the apparent presence of separate entities, I will also weigh the other arguments held by Armstrong and Chisholm as to their explanation in more parsimonious ways.
Feb 052001
Abstract:
I will attempt to explain why there is (quite literally) no time like the present; beginning with a discussion of what is meant by the term. Then I will consider the ontological status of “past” and “future.” How does the past time and the future time exist? Can statements about future states of the world be true or false? Why simultaneity represents a potential problem for some analyses of time? Is it more reasonable to view time philosophically as the fourth dimension of space/time rather than as a separate ontological entity?
Feb 042001
-
On Temporal Events and 4-Space
-
On The Status of Appearances
-
On Personal Identity
-
On Free Will and Determinism
Follow me on Twitter 




