I will, however, state that like Descartes, I know I exists just by pure virtue of my thinking about my existence. There are intimate connections with historical parts of the effects of my intentional actions upon the world. For example, yesterday I purchased a blank mini-disc using my bank card; the resultant, trace records of my existence through the financial records of my bank account, and the accumulation of ``stuff'' in my home. The complex relations between the people I know, and myself, persist and are changed only through gradual changes. All of this, however, presupposes a person's existence, namely mine; yet this is the very thing we are attempting to define. So this argument even fails to a certain degree by begging the question. Hence, I go back to Butler's notion of a non-trivial account existing for the continuity of personal identity. For if we cannot even understand personal identity when involving one stream of consciousness, how are we to even tackle problems of multiple personalities.