Introduction

Issues of personal identity are important in the field of metaphysics mainly because philosophers are unwilling to accept Modernity's answers of chemical reactions in the brain. Sydney Shoemaker observes that the existence of intentional states, and qualitative states of the mind, makes it difficult to see how any of this could be reducible to ``simple'' neuro-psychology. The questions coming to mind surrounding personal identity consist of those such as: what is it about personal identity that allows departures from the normal course of events? There have been many books in fiction and fact, written regarding the subject of memory loss, or memory transplantation, or implantation. Although it is something that does not occur often in nature, such events intrigue humans due to the value placed on one's self identity.

Shoemaker notes that if a wizard were able to reduce any object into a pile of sand, and then recreate that identical object, most of us would not be too averse to having this wizard attempt the trick on our kitchen stove. However, if the wizard would ask to attempt the trick on us, or a beloved, ``only a madman'' would agree to such a thing. Shoemaker explains this as directly linked to the special concern each of us has regarding his own future welfare.

Derek Parfit also pointed towards the concern each of us has regarding his future welfare. He considered the case of split-brain patients and the fictional teleporter. Humans have objections to such things as cloning, and replication (as in the teleporter) because the replica which will be created would mean that there is a death of ourselves here, while our replica, on Mars let's say, will continue where we left off. This bothers us tremendously because Parfit argues, we see our consciousness as having an existence apart from our body, which is not true.