Prior brings to the forefront the concept of the ``tapestry'' where everything is timeless and eternal. By defining the logical ``statement'' as once true, always true, the veracity of ``my sitting down is always true if it once was,'' is demonstrated. There is one stipulation to make this logical claim non-contradictory: qualifiers must be present of the time and place of the particular statement. Stating the time, removes the need for a tensed verb: I am sitting down at 02:30 (Eastern Standard Time) on January 27, 2001. This complete statement gives us a timeless property of a date or moment.[7, p. 104] Which is what, according to Prior, the tapestry metaphor is regarding. On the other hand, Prior precludes an event, which has happened - which is true - to be changeable. What is in the past is done, and nothing can change that, however, what is in the future (or at least the near future) is able to be instantiated by ourselves. Further, that the passage of time is not relative!
Going against B-Series events, Prior states that relativity of events is relegated to the physicists and philosophers of science: pastness, futurity and presentness are characteristics of events independent of the observer; however, under certain circumstances the events may be perceived by one or more observers. Humans do not think in relative terms and this might be part of the problem (debate).
Taking on a somewhat differing path, Broad states that there is no future, rather a becoming of events that then acquire new characteristics which they could not have before. In effect, as the event moves through time, from the present to the past, to the far past, it does not change its previously held relations, instead it acquires new relations.
Broad defines a difference between the acquisition of relations, as an object goes from the present, to the near past then to the far past, and the movement of events from the future, near or far, to the present. The latter he has called the Becoming of events; this differs from a simple ``change'' in that change requires the terms of the relations to exist both before and after it. For example, if we were to say that a traffic light has ``changed'' from red to green, then we are assuming that the traffic light had already existed in its red state, in order to be called a ``red'' traffic light.
Now, however, we stumble upon a quite interesting dilemma: if the future does not exist, then what is to become of the judgements about the future? Here, Broad states that no judgement about the future is absolutely certain (but note that neither is any judgement about the past.) He states that judgements about the future are not about whether we can have certain knowledge regarding the future. Rather, the question is what do we mean and what are we talking about when we refer to the veracity of judgements about the future? Broad states that we are talking about a certain set of characteristics (which are very real) but do not happen to refer to any real facts! The only time judgements about the future can be verified as true or false, is when there is a fact for them to refer to.