Existence of temporal events

The existence of temporal events have been denied outright by philosophers such as J.E. McTaggart, stating the distinction between A-Series events (past, present and future characteristics) and B-Series events (relational earlier than, and later than). B-Series is discounted by McTaggart because it relies on the existence of the very subject we are attempting to dissect: time. Whereas A-series events create a contradiction because all events have these characteristics, yet they are incompatible. Since B-Series relies on A-Series' proof in order to exist, and A-Series' argument fails, then there can be no B-Series events nor A-Series events. This leaves us without the existence of time itself![5]

Broad stated about the above argument: ``I should suppose that every reader must have felt the same way about it as any healthy-minded person feels about the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, viz., that it is obviously wrong somewhere, but that it may not be easy to say precisely what is wrong with it.'' The details of McTaggart's argument are very well beyond the scope of this essay, however, Broad has done a fine job of critiquing McTaggart's arguments.¹ Let us review this criticism.

Broad begins by asserting that there is no contradiction to be avoided with the instantiation of A-Series events. When McTaggart had stated that no one ``term'' could have the pastness, presentness, and futurity without a contradiction, this only applies to the simultaneity of at least two of these characteristics in one term.[2, p. 77] Broad continues to state that no term ever has had these characteristics simultaneously, but rather in succession.