Assignment #2
Elmo Recio
Computer Ethics - p.108 #5,8,12; p.78 #12,30
Page 108
Question 5:
The main difference between the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994 and the wiretapping ability the government had before is that it explicitly made clear that the government had the ability to continue operating (I.e. wiretapping- or it's modern day equivalent- packet sniffing) regardless of the technology deployed as the conduit. Hence, if in the near future a new method of transferring information were devised, the law would not be ambiguous.
Question 8:
In considering the arguments that CALEA and the mandatory escrow of encryption keys for greatest threat to our privacy, a few points must be taken into consideration. Firstly, that the government may have exclusive right to any and all information that is deemed as private and personal (not unlike the censors during WWII.) This may be a good thing in near sight, however, as one person put it, what if these terrorists that our government is trying to protect us from, get in power, surely this encryption will be necessary! The CALEA bill also threatens small businesses in the communication industry. It makes the business necessary for upgrading equipment and making sure that their equipment is able to be intercepted by the government. These actions take money, and may break, or deter small business.
Question 12:
Some arguments for use of a key escrow agent approved by government are basically the same reasons for ensured wire tapping capability. This is in order to be able to protect itself and its citizens against terrorists and the like. At the same time this is allowing for the best available, "top notch," security for private individuals. Several arguments against the use of a key escrow agent approved by government are: The government's abuse of the power in such situations where the key would get into the wrong hands; And by placing chips like "Clipper" chip into devices to spy on all American, will still not deter criminals because then they will continue to encrypt messages before it gets to the "Clipper" chip
Page 78:
Question 12:
One of the databases that probably has information on me is the Linux Counter Project data base. You enter information about your computer's specifications, what distribution of Linux you are using and it assigns you a unique user id. Then it places, if you so wish, your name and e-mail address on a web page under your locality's name. Another database that I am on is probably for QRZ (an amateur radio database of licensed operators). They have most of my information from the FCC (due to FOIA) and the rest (i.e.: Web site, interests, e-mail address).
The good part of both of these services is that it allows for the ease of communication between members of common interest groups. For example, if someone has a linux machine and they discovered a new piece of software for linux, I would like for them to contact me and let me know. On the same token, if someone is talking to me on the radio, it would be very convenient for me to tell them to go to the web page to get my e-mail address. Much more so than having to have to make them stop and write it down (especially if they are walking around on the street with their HT (handie-talkie)).
The obvious bad part about both of these sites is that this information may be used to send me unwanted mail (both snail mail and e-mail). There are software packages on the web that 'snake' the web from link to link, and grab e-mail addresses.
Question 30:
The terms of service document (http://www.navpoint.com/policy.html) denotes their (navpoint's) policies regarding privacy and use of their service.They state that the sending of unsolicited e-mails will incur a charge of $1.00 per account, to protect their users. Also, they tend to have a laissez faire attitude when it comes to personal materials on the user's web site. But they prohibit all the standard conducts, ie: spamming, distribution of copyrighted materials, spoofing ip's, attempting to disrupt service) However, it has a lot of don'ts but not too many do's.